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challenges to) philosophy. However, this 
method of  philosophy is not an entirely 
new way of  conducting an inquiry, but 
rather presents a refined and clarified 
view of  the way in which philosophy was 
originally formulated. As will be shown, 
the methods of  phenomenology are simply 
ways of  clarifying and augmenting the 
classical contributions to philosophy while, 
in addition, offering new perspectives 
and insights into the age-old questions 
surrounding philosophy and why these 
questions are often clouded in confusion 
and ambiguity. Special attention shall be 
paid to the phenomenological reduction 
and some of  the initial findings of  the 
movement, as well as their implications. 
Furthermore, the significance of  these 
findings in relation to their status as 
reactions against prior movements 
in philosophy will also be examined. 
However, before this can be undertaken, 
attention must be paid to the situation in 
modern philosophy that precipitated the 
need for phenomenology. In addition, 
the classical conception of  philosophical 
realism must be briefly examined as well 
to gain a full grasp of  the situation.
The Classical View of  Philosophy
Originally philosophy began not 
strictly as the clearly-stated study of  the 
nature of  truth, but rather as a form 
of  scientific cosmology that attempted 
to figure out the ultimate causes that 
permeated reality. Thales, one of  the 
progenitors of  the movement toward 
philosophy, with his identification of  the 
element of  water as the basic unitary 
feature of  matter, was the first in a series 
of  Greek thinkers that sought to identify 
what this unity consisted of.4 One basic 
feature of  all of  the Greek thinkers was the 
desire to come to an understanding of  the 
broadest principles of  reality. This quest 
was generally confused and convoluted as 
Introduction
The question of  the nature and scope 
of  philosophical discourse is one of  a 
contentious nature. The very direction of  
the field itself  is often shifted away from 
its platonic roots in one of  two general 
directions.1 First, some postmodernist 
thinkers have gone so far as to claim the 
death of  what people would generally 
describe as academic philosophy and, 
often times, of  the notion of  objective truth 
in general. Similar to this, other thinkers 
have likewise rejected past methods of  
philosophy but have instead conducted 
inquiries using the tools of  the various 
physical or psychological sciences, which 
they claim have reaped more sure and 
tangible progress in their particular fields. 
Sciences such as psychology and semiotics 
have often times been used to completely 
replace the fields of  epistemology and 
ontology. Much of  the current trend 
is to declare the classical practice of  
philosophy dead and obsolete because it 
is thought to be intrinsically impossible, 
or to simply absorb it into one of  the 
various other “sciences.”2 Even though 
the individuals that hold these ideas arrive 
at the conclusion they do, there is one 
general qualm that seems to run through 
the thought of  both of  the aforementioned 
groups. This concern is the seeming 
inability of  philosophers throughout the 
ages to come to sure conclusions regarding 
given problems.3
While this objection is not entirely 
without ground, it will be argued in this 
paper that this is not truly an accurate 
appraisal of  the situation. Indeed, as many 
modern thinkers have suggested, it is a case 
of  philosophy needing to be reformulated 
into a fuller and corrected manifestation 
of  its original intention. I argue that the 
contemporary theory of  philosophy 
known as phenomenology has the tools 
to deal with the difficult questions of  (and 
Phenomenology and the Rehabilitation of Philosophy
Matthew J. Berrios 
McNair Scholar
1. Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge, 2000), 198-202.
2. In this paper, the term “science” shall be broadly used to describe any organized body of  knowledge.
3. See also: Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? (Chicago: Franciscan, 1991), 1-10.
4. A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), 1-3.
Mark Pestana, Ph.D.
Faculty Mentor
11
VOLUME 15, 2011
isomorphism) between the concept in the 
mind and the object of  intellection there 
is truth.  
 
Kant and the Question of  Knowledge
This realist view was the general 
backdrop of  the philosophical enterprise 
up until the early modern period when 
the paradigm began to shift. Starting with 
thinkers such as John Locke and Rene 
Descartes and culminating with Immanuel 
Kant, the ability to achieve truth and true 
knowledge was systematically challenged.
 There are two general lines of  concern 
that contribute to this shift. One reason 
for this, as Immanuel Kant mentions, is 
the general lack of  surety or agreement 
between different philosophers.7 For 
example, one can point to certain 
mathematical or scientific texts as definitive 
in their respective fields, but we cannot do 
the same with philosophy. Because of  this, 
there was a greater push for philosophy 
to be performed using methods akin to 
the precise proofs found in mathematics 
and the other physical sciences. From 
this general direction of  concern came 
the eventual limiting of  philosophy by 
various methods depending on the thinker. 
Whether it was economics, politics, or 
physics, philosophy was being constantly 
limited by various other fields of  study 
that either intentionally or unintentionally 
sought to supplant the traditional methods 
of  philosophy. However, the main influence 
on modern concerns about the possibility 
of  attaining knowledge comes from the 
philosophical critiques of  Immanuel Kant.
One important feature of  Kant’s 
analysis that fueled his concerns about 
how knowledge exists was his synthetic-
analytic/a priori-a posteriori distinction 
by which he characterized what is meant 
by different types of  knowledge. According 
to Kant, there are statements that have 
a universal quality (i.e., the a priori) and 
statements that are empirical observations 
of  singulars (i.e., the a posteriori). In the 
former (the a priori), a universal statement 
or determination is made that includes all 
possible entities referred to by the concept. 
One example of  an a priori proposition 
into the nature of  things insofar as they 
hold interest as a psychological, physical, 
or neurological phenomenon. This was 
indicative of  the classical idea that our 
ability to achieve truth is also an ability 
to step back and consider the world in 
its totality and not merely in reference to 
limited facets of  its existence. This idea 
will become more important later when 
considering the role of  phenomenology in 
restoring philosophy to its original objects 
and methods of  investigation. 
This focusing of  the object of  
philosophy on the study of  being also 
resulted in the separating off  of  the other 
sciences into their own fields of  specificity. 
As such, physics became separated from 
metaphysics while fields such as neurology 
became separated from the philosophy 
of  mind. Considering various topics 
philosophically, the objects of  speculation 
then became more removed, in a certain 
sense, from the everyday sort of  scientific 
investigation that a study of  physics or 
biology would entail. Because of  this, 
philosophy came to be viewed as more 
of  a contemplative enterprise by those in 
the disciplines because its methods were 
not physical methods aimed towards 
certain aspects of  existence, but rather 
contemplative methods aimed at existence 
as a whole. As far as justification of  such 
a philosophical knowledge was concerned, 
the Greeks saw that the self-evidencing of  
ultimate phenomenon was necessary, for 
what other tools (such as the tools involved 
in biological, physical, or economic 
research) could possibly exist beyond 
universal phenomenon of  features to study 
those features which are, by definition, 
the limits or structures of  knowledge and 
of  knowable entities?6 This concept will 
come back into the philosophical picture 
later with the general concern over the 
nature of  the justification for philosophical 
knowledge.
One more fact that is worthy of  note 
is the emergence of  the formulation of  
the correspondence theory of  truth, which 
holds that truth value is achieved when 
what is “in the mind” coordinates to what 
is “out there in the world.” According to 
this theory, when there is agreement (or 
one would expect in a new field of  study 
that must, by practical necessity, grapple 
with ways to express brand new ideas. 
However, what united most of  these earlier 
thinkers was the underlying belief  that 
reality is indeed intelligible, organized, 
and accessible. It must be highlighted that 
the basic idea that underlies all of  this 
thought about the structure of  the world 
is the acceptance of  the idea that we can 
indeed know reality as it is in itself. This 
idea, popularly called realism, was the 
underlying thread that permeated most 
philosophies up until the early modern 
era in philosophy, which began in the 
16th century. It seems like a simple idea, 
but it is one that unites the search for all 
forms of  knowledge besides that of  the 
strictly philosophical variety. This concept 
of  realism is implicitly found in all of  
the sciences, which seeks to discover the 
nature of  existent entities in so far as they 
are considered biologically, physically, 
etc. Indeed one could justly regard the 
academic enterprise folly if  our ability to 
attain truth was considered impaired.
Philosophy began to be understood as 
the study of  truth first with Socrates, Plato 
and Aristotle as a clearly demarcated field 
of  truth in its highest categories. A constant 
theme for Plato was the nature of  truth, and 
in various dialogues the type of  knowledge 
that he considered genuinely philosophical 
relates to non-contingent essences which 
give existent entities their intelligibility 
and being as concrete particulars. In this 
way, the many facets of  life can all be 
considered philosophically insofar as the 
essence of  existent entities is the primary 
focus and not their intelligibility insofar as 
it relates to just any one other science (i.e., 
physics or biology).
The idea of  philosophical knowledge 
as the study of  truth in its highest 
categories could also be expressed by 
Aristotle in his phrase of  philosophy as 
the study of  “being qua being” in which 
he outlines his concept of  first philosophy 
or metaphysics.5 By this, Aristotle was 
referring to a field of  study that examines 
existent entities from the point of  view of  
their existing as things in general. This 
would be opposed to an investigation 
5. Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. John McMahon (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1991), 66.
6. See also: Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 71-85.
7. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. Gary Hatfield (New York: Cambridge), 5-6.
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movement sought to respond to in its 
restoration of  philosophy.
Edmund Husserl and the Origin of  
Phenomenology
Such problems formed the background 
for a young German mathematician-
philosopher named Edmund Husserl 
when he sought to discover the basis of  
logic. Husserl wanted to find out where 
the inner necessity of  logical concepts 
could come from and began to notice 
that the then-current Kantian-influenced 
strains of  psychologistic philosophy could 
not ultimately or even adequately explain 
the necessity of  such truth concepts. 
For example, if  the mind is that which 
structures the world (and thus truth) then 
how could one explain the truth value of  
that statement (that the mind structures 
truth) in the first place?
To accomplish his goal, Husserl 
adapted the first-person introspective 
experiments of  Gestalt psychology. He 
sought to eliminate philosophical confusion 
by returning to “the things themselves,” 
which he refers to as any phenomenon 
insofar as it is given to experience. This 
is important because, ultimately, our 
knowledge of  the world comes from 
our experience of  it, even if  the idea of  
experience is much broader than some 
would be willing to recognize. In this sense 
Husserl sought to come to a direct intuition 
(intellectual apprehension) of  the source of  
and evidence for the concepts/problems 
he was investigating. Through his method, 
he wanted philosophy to receive a fresh 
start.
With much hope and promise, 
Husserl thought the phenomenological 
movement had started to unravel the 
supposed problems and pseudo-problems 
of  philosophy. However, the movement 
quickly fractured off  into various schools 
such as the existentialists (e.g., Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, and De Beauvoir), the 
realists (e.g., Von Hidebrand, Scheler, and 
Stein), and the hermeneutic school (e.g., 
Ricoeur, Gadamer, Heidegger). While 
all of  these schools have made their own 
unique contributions to phenomenology, 
necessity of  the objects of  knowledge as 
being created by the mind of  the inquirer. 
Presupposed in this theory was the Lockean 
concept of  mind as an “internal screen” of  
sorts that projected to the ego the input or 
data from the senses. While Locke assumed 
constancy between the “external world” 
and the sensations “inside” the mind, Kant 
saw no reason to do so. One important 
reason for this is the fact that there is no 
way of  investigating whether or not the 
world is as it is outside of  our perceptions 
if  our “internal” perceptions are all we can 
truly know.9
Because of  this, Kant shifted the 
structuring element of  reality from 
things in themselves to the human 
mind. For Kant, it was the mind that 
contained within itself  the structures that 
made perception possible. The various 
structuring categories that Aristotle listed 
(quantity, quality, relation, etc.) that once 
were considered properties of  things 
themselves were now posited as structures 
in the mind. Space and time were 
completely reduced to basic intuitions of  
the mind. Instead of  being structures that 
were the order of  the world, they became 
mental acts/intuitions that constitute or 
construct the world. Metaphysics, as the 
study of  being qua being was practically 
reduced to studying the so-called a priori 
structures of  the mind (psychologism). An 
unbridgeable gulf, theoretically speaking, 
thus emerged between thought and world. 
Because of  this perceived gulf, the very 
idea of  the achievement of  knowledge 
became threatened because of  the lack of  
direct access to the world.
These reasons, taken together, can 
be viewed as the starting point for the 
disintegration of  philosophical thought 
into post-modernity, whether it is the post-
modernity of  Nietzsche and his family of  
followers or the scientism of  Ayer and the 
other positivists. While the former of  these 
two groups  generally related more to our 
inability to achieve genuine philosophical 
knowledge of  reality at all, it was the 
latter type that sought philosophical truth 
with a scientific (the physical sciences) 
methodology. It was primarily these 
two groups that the phenomenological 
would be “all men are rational animals.” 
In this proposition, a universal statement 
has been proclaimed about any currently 
or possible existing man.8  
This is contrasted with the a posteriori 
statement in which a singular existing 
entity is referred to. An example of  this 
style of  proposition would be “this table 
is square.” In this statement, the nature 
of  tables in general is not referred to but 
rather a quality of  this particular table.
These categories could also be paired 
with the further categories of  synthetic and 
analytic statements. An analytic statement 
is one in which the subject of  the proposition 
has included within it the predicate with 
which it is adjoined. An example of  an 
analytic statement would be “all bachelors 
are single” because within the concept 
of  bachelor the quality of  being single is 
already explicitly assumed. The other type 
of  statement is the synthetic statement in 
which what is predicated of  the subject is 
something that is not explicitly contained 
within the concept with which it is joined. 
An example of  this type of  statement 
would be “seven plus four equals eleven.” 
In this statement, the concept of  eleven 
is not contained within the concepts of  
four or seven; something new is being said 
about the subject. 
These categories of  a priori/a 
posteriori and synthetic-analytic yield four 
combinations: analytic-a priori, analytic-a 
posteriori, synthetic-a posteriori, and 
synthetic-a priori. For Kant, it was this 
last category that true philosophical 
knowledge consists of  as the synthetic-a 
priori statement is universal in nature and 
does not tautologically repeat whatever 
concept/predicate is contained explicitly 
with the subject. This was the genesis of  
the main question for all philosophers 
following in the footsteps of  Kant: how 
do we seemingly attain knowledge of  
universals when we, as Hume thought 
and Kant agreed, only have (in one sense) 
experience of  singulars?
This is where Kant’s famous 
“Copernican Revolution” in philosophy 
occurred. In this theory, Kant shifted the 
direction of  the formation of  thought from 
knowledge as passive receptivity to the 
8. See also: Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. J. Meiklejohn (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1990), 1-18.
9. Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 8-11.
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the hallway or as simply a hat and coat on a 
rack.  This openness is important because, 
in a way, all of  these features belong to the 
essence of  the phenomenon. However, it 
is important to note that this reduction is 
simply a tool that will assist in maximizing 
the observed richness of  the phenomenon 
and that assessing which aspects of  the 
phenomenon are most essential will come 
much later in the process.
The feature of  the process that 
follows the initial reduction is known as 
the phenomenological variation. In this 
method, as many different variations 
as are practical are performed on the 
phenomenon. Throughout this search for 
variations, invariants are looked for that 
governs the perceptions of  the observer. 
It is through this analysis of  invariants 
that a sense of  finality is achieved 
although for some phenomenon it is only 
a relative finality. Through this method 
several regularities and formal structures 
were indeed discovered by Husserl. 
However, before going into some of  the 
particular findings of  phenomenology, an 
examination of  the theoretical attitude 
implied by this method of  openness should 
be laid out in order to clearly realize its 
implications for philosophy.13
The Phenomenological Attitude and 
the Domain of  Evidence
As implied by its name, phenome-
nology is, tautologically, the study of  
phenomenon. In Husserl’s view, this means 
literally any phenomenon insofar as it is 
given in perception. Any phenomenon 
such as religious experience, logic, or 
emotions may be evidence insofar as it is 
directly intuited (beheld or apprehended) 
by the one investigating. This feature is 
highly and purposely emphasized in order 
to keep a genuine openness so as not to 
exclude any possible data which could 
reveal something about reality. It is an 
openness akin to the ancient view of  our 
ability to step back and look at the world 
in its totality.
In this way, phenomenology could 
be described as a radical empiricism,  in 
observers would likely answer differently. 
While the former observer would 
undoubtedly bring religious beliefs about 
pyramids to bear on the analysis of  the 
phenomenon, the geometrician would 
probably consider it as a teaching tool with 
his background as a mathematician. The 
problem is that both of  these individuals 
have, in a way, already decided from the 
outset the essence of  the wire pyramid 
because of  the system of  beliefs that 
they brought to bear in analyzing the 
phenomenon. The basic function behind 
the epoche could basically be described 
as performing the task of  keeping the 
phenomenological observer’s mind open 
so as not to exclude any phenomenon, 
possible data, or aspects of  reality. 
Related to this is the idea that 
phenomenological observers must, in light 
of  this openness, describe what they are 
seeing to the best of  their ability and not 
simply state what the phenomenon is right 
from the start: To state definitively what 
its essence is violates the principle of  the 
epoche and the openness to evidence that 
it is supposed to engender. For example, 
if  one were asked to give the essence of  
the color black, they would probably get 
a variety of  responses from the observers. 
These answers would probably include 
black as either a color or the absence of  
color. However, if  one were to point at a 
black object and describe it, they would 
probably respond simply, “black.” In this 
way the difference between describing and 
defining can be seen as vital to the possible 
richness of  things themselves.11
The next step of  the phenome-
nological reduction is related to the first: 
the phenomenon must be apodictic 
in its appearance. In other words, 
the phenomenon must be certain in 
appearance, even though the observer 
might not be certain as to what is exactly 
appearing before him. For example, if  one 
were to observe and describe a coat and 
hat on a rack at the end of  a dim hallway, 
he must only describe the phenomenon 
as it certainly appears to him; namely, as 
a phenomenon that presents itself  in the 
appearance of  either a person cowering in 
my reading and analysis is primarily 
influenced by the realist school as I 
believe it most clearly exemplifies, in one 
sense, a faithful continuation of  Husserl’s 
original vision for the phenomenological 
movement.
 
The Phenomenological Method
However, before proceeding with 
criticisms and responses to Kant and the 
positivists, it would be prudent to lay out 
the method that Husserl himself  developed 
in order to proceed with his investigations. 
The method that Husserl developed was 
a series of  steps that carefully sought 
to eliminate observer bias as much as 
possible and to increase the precision and 
objectivity of  the reported experience. 
This set of  methods is also known as the 
phenomenological reduction. 
The first step of  the method is called 
the “epoche.” The epoche is a backing 
away from the standard way of  mental 
participation in the world in which 
assumptions are (as best as is possible) left 
behind. This is the theoretical term that 
Husserl used to describe the theoretical 
openness held in contrast to the systemic 
constructions of  certain contemporary 
analytic philosophers, as mentioned 
before. It refers to a sort of  temporary 
suspension of  belief  in any feature of  a 
phenomenon being any more essential 
that the other. In this sense, the observer 
equalizes all experienced phenomena as 
much as possible. Again, this is important 
because of  the fact that it is easy for any 
observer to bring their prior assumptions 
about the essences of  certain phenomena 
to bear on a situation or to unjustifiably 
limit the scope of  essential possibility from 
the outset.10
An example of  unintentionally brin-
ging bias into an analysis would be if  
two individuals were analyzing a wire 
pyramid (one of  the individuals being an 
ancient Egyptian who knew nothing of  
geometry, and the other being an ancient 
Greek geometrician who knew nothing of  
Egyptian pyramids) and a third individual 
asked them to describe the pyramid.  The 
10. See also: Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, (Albany: SUNY, 1986) 32.
11. Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 34.
12. Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 33.
13. See also: Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 179-180.
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this idea of  intentionality from his teacher 
Franz Brentano, who in turn acquired this 
notion from the tradition of  Aristotle and 
his medieval followers. This idea states that 
all of  our experiences (thinking, willing, 
etc.) are always about something.16 
With this, Husserl noted that there 
is a basic shape to experience: the object 
perceived and the accompanying act 
of  perception which invariably and 
necessarily accompanies the object. He 
termed the object of  perception the 
“noema” or “noematic object,” and he 
termed the mental act of  disclosure the 
“noesis” or “noetic act.” In this basic 
structure of  intentional consciousness, the 
self  or ego is only implicitly assumed as the 
bearer of  experience and is not a direct 
object of  “introspection.”17 
Superficially, this observation of  
intentionality perhaps seems rather 
dull and unnecessary until one begins 
to unpack all of  what is implied by this 
statement. According to Locke and 
Kant, what we are directly aware of  is 
an image in our consciousness. However, 
if  one were to thoroughly analyze his 
or her experiences of  phenomenon, an 
experience of  pure consciousness would 
nowhere be encountered, but only the 
things themselves. Because of  this, the 
theoretical doorway from our minds 
to the world is demolished; the bridge 
between mind and world is revealed as a 
pseudo-problem. Knowledge is once more 
theoretically viable because of  the bridging 
of  mind and world.
Another piece of  evidence against 
Kant would be the phenomenological 
experience of  the logically objective nature 
of  Kant’s claims. For example, if  the limits 
for truth are the a priori structures of  the 
mind, then there is no way Kant could 
objectively make that claim, for then the 
logic that he uses would be above and prior 
to his mind, ontologically speaking. Again, 
if  all that can be (in terms of  knowledge) is 
what the mind forms, then describing the 
nature of  the mind would be impossible 
to objectively do. This phenomenon of  
experienced truth in that case does not at 
all match up with what Kant has said about 
contain within itself  reference to its own 
negation (to what it is not). This statement 
conditions all of  our thinking about any 
possible conditions of  reality. Because of  
this, the aforementioned proposition, while 
existing as a material element of  existence, 
must also subsist as a formal element that 
reaches out to all real and possible beings.15 
This is important to note as this is a basic 
axiom to be accepted and intuited if  the life 
of  reason is to be entered at all. To enter 
into any rational discussion or discourse is 
to implicitly assume the universal validity 
of  the principle of  non-contradiction.
The basic character of  the 
phenomenological objections could be 
phrased as follows: why should topics such 
as metaphysics or ethics be considered any 
less real because they are not able to be 
verified in the way that a physical object can 
be by an “objective” party of  observers? 
While it is, admittedly, difficult to verify 
logical and metaphysical phenomenon, it 
only can be prejudicial towards the search 
for truth if  all possible evidence is not taken 
into consideration. This inquiry becomes 
truly philosophical when the categories 
of  acceptable evidence are broadened 
to include anything that appears to the 
observer. This is the attitude that early 
thinkers had when they viewed philosophy 
as a stepping back from the world to be 
able to view it in its totality. As shown in the 
next section, the findings of  this method 
and attitude have cleared away much of  
the ambiguity that surrounded much of  
the critical problem in modern philosophy.
Some	Specific	Findings:	Objections,	
Responses,	and	Implications
 The plan for this philosophical method 
was simple: with the phenomenological 
reduction in play, the phenomenologist 
was to seek out the invariant features 
in experience (i.e., essences) that 
characterized it or appeared in it. When 
this was done, one phenomenon quickly 
started to re-occur as basic: intentionality. 
By this term, Husserl referred to the idea 
that all of  our thoughts or perceptions 
were about something. Husserl acquired 
the sense that the definition of  what is 
considered to be valid empirical evidence 
is not arbitrarily limited as it is in some 
systems of  philosophical thought (such as 
that of  the positivists). In logical positivism, 
as exemplified by A.J. Ayer, a statement 
can only be meaningful if  it is either 
(1) empirically verifiable or (2) a logical 
tautology (analytic a priori statement); 
that is, a statement where the predicate 
is contained within the subject (i.e.,  All 
bachelors are unmarried: the concept of  
bachelor already references the state of  not 
being married).14
The point made against this notion 
by phenomenologists is that the largely 
physical-centered criteria of  empirical 
evidence that the positivist uses implicitly 
assumes that the only kind of  verifiable 
existence is of  the physical. The 
phenomenological criticism of  this first 
point is important because it reveals the 
generally arbitrary and non-necessary 
character of  the positivist notion of  the 
empirical. By outlining what the domain 
of  suitable or valid evidence is, the 
positivist assumes the very point that they 
are attempting to prove when they attack 
metaphysical notions.
One other example that would 
be helpful in illustrating the positivist 
assumption is an analysis of  the 
foundational character of  the logic that 
positivists assume in any analysis that they 
give (in particular the principle of  non-
contradiction: that something cannot be 
true and non-true in the same sense and 
at the same time). According to their own 
principles of  “empirical observation” 
positivists would be wholly unable to 
ground the very logic they depend on for 
their system of  thought because logical 
“entities” cannot be analyzed in the way 
that contingent physical features can be 
analyzed. 
One further point that follows from 
this in regard to the second criteria of  
positivism is the fact that the principle 
of  non-contradiction is not itself  an 
analytical statement: it is synthetic. In the 
statement that “(A) cannot be (non-A),” the 
concept of  any being does not explicitly 
14. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952) 5.
15. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? 84-85.
16. See also: Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 8-16.
17. See also: Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 43-50.
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meant as a new way of  doing philosophy 
but rather as a much clearer expression 
and development of  what it was originally 
intended to be.
Another line of  objection concerns 
the justification of  beliefs about the 
nature of  the mind and world. How 
can one justify the basic principles of  
experience, phenomenologically speaking, 
with something beyond the experience of  
reality if  one is not to head into an infinite 
regress? There often seems to be theoretical 
grounds for doubting our perceptions (in 
the manner of  Descartes even).
 One answer would be that, as the 
ancients thought, there must be something 
self-justifying about our experience of  
things in the world. It would also be 
accurate to state that the kind of  surety 
that such objectors require is not even 
possible, in principle, because of  the 
fact that truth or its justification is not 
something that can be taken by force or 
possessed as a mere object in the world. 
In addition, the discovery of  deception 
implies that a certain truth relating to the 
actual state of  affairs has been intuited. 
The apprehension of  entities comes prior 
to any other intellectual stance that one 
can take toward them. In this way it can be 
seen how any organized attempt to doubt 
apprehension is futile, as any attempt to 
doubt an object pre-supposes its prior 
existence.
Phenomenology as the Continuation 
of  the Classical Notion of  Philosophy
Throughout all of  the 
phenomenological objections put forward 
against some modern philosophies, one 
general trend exists: namely, the idea 
that the ability to participate in the world 
is knowledge. To even begin rational 
discussion, our ability to achieve truth 
is implicitly assumed. Because of  these 
ideas and findings of  phenomenology, 
the debris caused by several centuries of  
philosophical rubble is cleared in order to 
let philosophy flourish as it was originally 
formulated. This is not to say that the 
movement has generated solutions to 
all of  the philosophical problems out 
there; there is much yet to be solved. 
I believe that it is only the case that 
phenomenology has cleared a pathway for 
future contributions to the field. Again, the 
tools of  phenomenology are not strictly 
the nature of  how the mind conditions 
truth. In this aspect, Kant’s theory does 
not match up with what presents itself  to 
the mind of  the honest phenomenological 
observer. In this way, knowledge is observed 
to be a passive receptivity in which we 
receive knowledge in accordance with our 
attentiveness to the phenomenon.18 
However, while the aforementioned 
evidential phenomenon supports the 
phenomenological position, there are some 
phenomenon that support other theories 
of  the mind. One example that could 
imply a Kantian model of  the mind would 
be hallucinations. The question could be 
posed as such: if  we truly experience the 
world as it is, then how does one explain 
the nature of  hallucinations (which are 
implicitly assumed as not truly of  the 
world). However, there are equally suitable 
explanations for hallucinations that lend 
themselves just as much, logically speaking, 
to a direct realist model of  consciousness 
(wherein we directly behold the world as it 
is) as postulated by ancient and medieval 
philosophers. As such, there is not truly as 
much reason to consider mind as separate 
from the world, especially if  our conscious 
experiences of  the world are inseparably 
and intentionally related to it. 
The objection could still be made 
against phenomenology that one cannot 
see and verify the universals that we use 
in logic and as such must exclude them. 
However, this line of  objection exemplifies 
the type of  automatic exclusion that the 
openness of  the epoche was designed to 
create. Because we experience universals 
or logical principles as somehow or 
another “in the world,” then philosophical 
patience, attentiveness, and diligence 
become required to delve into their secrets, 
rather than an automatic exclusion of  
relevant information that could provide 
genuine insight into the true nature of  
things just because they do not fit into a pre-
constructed paradigm. Truth is something 
that gains its meaning from the fact that 
it is not all revealable at the same time. 
There is often the implicit assumption that 
whatever is knowable must be something 
which is accessible to everybody at every 
time, which is not necessarily the case.
18. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? 13-25.
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